I work on self-referential probability and rationality. Self-referential probability senarios are situations where the agent’s credences can act as evidence for the truth or likelihood of a proposition. My focus has been on the Probabilistic Liar, which has structural similarity to the Liar paradox.
In my PhD I used the Probabilistic Liar as a useful example and focus to explore suspended judgment in a credal framwork, norms of rationality and their underlying logics, the nature of degrees of belief and problems for indeterminacy and the logic of higher order indeterminacy. I am now working on extending my account of indeterminacy to decision theory.
I also have an interest in questions about the connection between belief formation and imagination. I am interested in these questions in the context of self-deception.
PhD in Philosophy, 2022
University of Leeds
MA in Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics, 2017
University of Bristol
BSc in Mathematics and Philosophy with specialism in Logic and Foundations, 2016
University of Warwick
In this paper I argue that the rational attitude to adopt towards the Probabilistic Liar is to suspend judgment. After presenting the problem that the Probabilistic Liar poses for traditional accounts of rationality I develop an account of how suspended judgment should be understood in a credal framework. I argue that a suspended judgment ought to be understood as having imprecise credences of a certain form. I show how this understanding fits with our intuitions about suspended judgment as serves as a solution to the Probabilistic Liar.
There are a variety of norms that purport to govern what attitude an agent ought to adopt. It is unclear, however, what attitude a rational agent ought to have towards an indeterminate proposition or whether there is a norm that prescribes an attitude. It is also unclear what falls under the term indeterminate and the range of phenomena that might be referred to as indeterminate. This paper address the normative question of what attitude a rational agent ought to adopt towards cases of indeterminacy. I defend the view that indeterminacy should be understood as an umbrella term that encompasses a range of related phenomena. In light of this I argue we should adopt a position I call modest pluralism to the normative question. Modest pluralism holds that there is no unique attitude an agent ought to adopt to cases of indeterminacy, but rather a range of permissible attitudes to adopt.
When I’m not doing philosophy, I can be found rock climbing, running or hiking.
I also play the cello and have performed with ensembles across the UK and Europe as well as solo performances (including recent forays into playing at friend’s weddings!).
I’ve taken part in two film projects as a cellist: